An important part of my work engages with foundational questions in legal theory. I'm particularly interested in developing a clear methodology for answering ontological & metaphysical questions about law.

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More recently, I've been focusing on certain key challenges in AI governance. I examine, in particular, whether existing AI regulatory frameworks can adequately respond to emerging responsibility gaps, especially under the EU AI Act.

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I'm also concerned with the various elements that constitute the nature of institutional agency: from group organisation to group action. While some prominent accounts focus narrowly on individual planning capacities and/or human-centred decision-making, I investigate how institutional groups can perform intentional actions through the implementation of AI systems. This shifts attention towards the risks associated with incorporating AI reasoning into institutional processes.
 

Work-in-progress:
- A paper examining the formal properties of normative generic statements and the role they play in justifying defeasible normative inferences.
- A paper developing a robust account of group reasons as a basis for attributing collective responsibility to institutional group agents.
- A co-authored paper (with Nicolai Knudsen) on the nature of algorithmic kinds.

- A paper on a fault-based liability framework for algorithmic responsibility.